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REGULATING MARKETS AND SOCIAL EUROPE: NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
Imelda Maher*

I. INTRODUCTION
Governance understood as the diffusion and fragmentation of
governmental arrangements is exemplified by the multi-level governance
structures of the EU itself. Since its foundation, its supra-national
character led to policy formation and implementation at different levels of
government. More recently, and partly as a result of recognition of the
extent to which the EU is more dependent on regulation as an instrument
of governance than traditional state polities,1 there has been a
reconceptualisation of both the methods and instruments of governing at
the European level. Initially, innovation was triggered by the Single
European Act which both introduced framework directives where detailed
regulatory specifications were no longer set out at the European level but
were in many instances delegated to private standard setting bodies2 and
which started the ongoing (and often politically contentious) liberalisation
programme.3 The liberalisation of energy and communications industries
that previously were state monopolies combined competition and
regulation with the emergence of enforcement agencies in turn spurring
the creation of a patchwork of agency networks across Europe.4
*
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Under the Lisbon process5 newer forms of governance have emerged.
Like the Single Market Programme these were linked to a deadline and an
objective but unlike that programme, the governance methods, captured
under the umbrella term ‘the open method of coordination’ were primarily
based on policy learning, reporting and the issuance of guidelines all
firmly within the realm of soft law6 which may or may not result in
binding legal measures.7 This departs from the classic Monnet method
where the Commission proposes legislation which is adopted by the
Council (and now under co-decision with the European Parliament),
although the privatisation of standard-setting under the Single Act marked
an earlier departure from this classic approach. Both Lisbon and the
Single Market are underpinned by competition and competitiveness, with
a competitiveness Council of Ministers being set up post-Lisbon.
Competitiveness implies a more dirigiste industrial policy and is
sometimes seen as undermining competition although in the EU
competition policy with a strong economics-based rationale is seen as
dominating policy formation leading to tensions on at least two planes.
First, politically the French ‘no’ in part is seen as due to opposition to the
perceived liberal market agenda of the EU. This in part may explain the
French insistence on the removal of a reference to free competition in
Article 4 of the EC Treaty. Second, the potential tension between
competition and competitiveness reflects the search for a balance between
5

The core objective as articulated by the European Council in Lisbon in 2000 was to
make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion with a deadline of 2010. This has now been reduced to growth and jobs and the
deadline has been dropped see generally, EC Commission, Delivering on Growth and
Jobs: A New and Integrated Economic and Employment Co-ordination Cycle in the EU,
SEC(2005) 193, Brussels, 3.2.2005.

6

Where soft law is seen as measures which are non-binding but are capable (and may
even be intended to have) binding effects see F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European
Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, in Daintith, Terence,
(ed.) Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule (1995,
Chichester: Wiley) at 64.

7

D. Hodson, and I. Maher, ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case
of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of Common Market Studies
719
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structural reform – which goes to the heart of the Lisbon agenda – and
what can loosely be described as ‘social Europe’.
The authors in this series of papers address these two phenomena of the
relationship between ‘new’ and ‘old’ governance and the tensions between
the ‘market’ defined in terms of strong competition policy and social
Europe. The first paper by Scott provides an overview of the nature of
new governance and addresses the vexed – and the long-standing - issue of
legitimacy. This is followed by two substantive papers. Clarke examines
the Takeover Directive and the extent to which its flexibility has impeded
its original objective of improving European international
competitiveness. Barrett then looks at ‘Social Europe’ examining two
different governance methods and their limitations. The last two papers
build on these two substantive fields with Deakin examining whether or
not there is asymmetric governance between market regulation and social
Europe (in this instance European company law and labour law) while
Zumbansen through an exploration of European and German company law
offers further insights into the issue of diversity in corporate governance in
Europe and its re-assertion following problems in securing harmonisation
and in the process explores the nature of the firm looking, like Deakin at
both corporate governance and labour law.
Colin Scott sets the scene for the papers that follow by contrasting more
traditional conceptions of EU governance with an analysis of the variety
of forms of ‘new governance’ arguing that some of the more innovative
modes of governance are not in fact so new while some of the more recent
modes of governance while new are not that innovative. The question he
addresses is whether this limited conception of new governance is
inevitable given the legitimacy constraints within which the EU operates
or whether there is potential for developing a broader conception of
governance which through wider participation and involvement of nongovernmental governing capacities might bolster legitimacy through both
better processes and better outcomes. The diffusion of governing
capacity, a hallmark of governance, has important implications for what
type of instrument is possible as binding legal instruments are usually only
available to central government. At the same time, non-governmental
actors can do things that are not possible – or legitimate - for
governmental actors. Thus the fragmentation of governance calls into
question the focus on legitimation through democratic mechanisms, where
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legitimacy is conceived of as decision which command support and are
followed by those affected by them whether or not they agree with them.
Because of the chronic democratic deficit in the EU, legitimacy has been
predicated on outputs to a much grater degree than within states. Thus he
argues that evaluation of legitimacy of emerging governance methods
might examine the extent to which non-governmental actors and processes
are engaged with markets and communities (alternative forms of
accountability well-rehearsed in the regulation literature), seen as offering
alternative legitimation mechanisms. The shift from law-based to
network-based governance is not that innovative as opportunities to better
engage with non-governmental capacities have been neglected or
restricted in part by concerns for democratic legitimacy.
Blanaid Clarke examines the goals and achievements of the Takeover
Directive which arose out of concerns for European competitiveness with
an integrated European capital market seen as an important dimension of
improving international competitiveness. The paper paints a bleak picture
of failure to realise those objectives and how diversity remains. There is
some light at the end of the proverbial tunnel with the issue of diverse
national regimes analysed further by both Deakin and Zumbansen.
Clarke notes that the directive in fact does not increase international
competitiveness – largely due to the protectionist attitude of a large
number of Member States in their implementation of it. It does provide a
minimum standard but for those states that already had those standards
there is no benefit and even the possibility of greater uncertainty. While
arguably the directive provides a useful structure for new Member States,
this is not essential as there are examples of states who introduced national
takeover regimes before the Directive. The long history of the Directive
also highlights the potential for policy learning – usually associated with
soft law regimes - at the national level even where there is a failure to
adopt legislation at the EU level with German law incorporating a
mandatory bid rule despite having resisted such a measure in earlier EC
proposals. She also notes the difficulties of moving from a voluntary (and
effective) system in the UK to one requiring statutory foundation
potentially reducing flexibility and, by implication, effectiveness and this
despite the emphasis on flexibility within the Directive itself. By opting
for a basic principles model the Directive ensures that takeover regulation
will vary at national level. This retains the scope for regulatory innovation
and, given that variation generates regulatory competition, may lead to
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specialisation in different national regimes rather than convergence across
regimes. At the same time, use is made of soft law instruments: notably
the Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory
Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Boards. While Clarke concedes that soft law is appropriate
where one size cannot fit all, there is a problem with some aspects of
corporate governance falling between regulatory stools thereby
undermining legitimacy as the EC creates expectations (e.g. of a level
playing field and common set of rules for takeovers) which it cannot meet.
Gavin Barrett explores how elusive consensus has proved for EU social
policy and the impact this has had on the governance methods chosen:
focussing on the European social dialogue and legislation with
effectiveness and input legitimacy (in particular in relation to the range of
voices heard) central concerns in his analysis.
Social dialogue is a
Treaty-based policy making process whereby management and employee
representatives cooperate in policy and law making. The process has had
some successes in leading to legislation and some failures leading to the
perception that the Open Method was needed to achieve EC goals. Barrett
identifies the process as flexible: leading to an extraordinary range of
outcomes; evolving, with a major role of the Commission and a weak role
for the Parliament.
The challenges for the partnership: lack of
transparency, lack of openness to other non-governmental actors once
agreement is reached and the challenges of enlargement are also outlined.
Looking at a specific piece of legislation – the Acquired Rights Directive
– Barrett notes the long history of its adoption exacerbated by the need for
unanimity. This in turn led to omissions designed to ensure sufficient
consensus for adoption which propels the European Court in its
interpretative role, into the role of quasi-lawmaker. The discussion points
to the potential for ambiguity and lack of precision in the text – criticism
normally raised (as seen in Clarke’s paper) in relation to soft law
instruments. The difference between the two forms of law being that the
Court remains as final arbiter where the ambiguity lies in legislation.
Barrett’s paper explores the implementation of the Directive in the Irish
context noting the importance that flows from the chosen method of
implementation, the potential that implementation has to disrupt a national
law and the extent to which the industrial relations context has on the
impact of the directive. The impact of the directive is also affected by the
adequacy or otherwise of remedies and sanctions – the absence of sanction
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being a common complaint in relation to soft law measures.
Implementation is also achieved through a parallel social dialogue
operating on a consensus basis meaning only one optional measure has
been adopted.
Deakin explores recent experience in European company law which, as
Clarke’s paper has shown, bucks the trend towards new governance
techniques. He then draws on this analysis to frame a wider discussion of
the prospects for the European social model in the context of market
liberalisation. He asks whether there will be an asymmetric approach with
the flexible new governance techniques dominant in social and
employment policy with hard law imposing a single model (or at least
minimum standards) in the field of company law and the internal market?
The nuanced answer to this question is salutary for advocates of the open
method as a form of flexible governance. Like Scott, he sees new
governance as in fact having important continuities with earlier
governance practices with reflexive harmonisation a precursor which
accommodated diversity of practice among member states. Company law
has acquiring its own (modified) form of the open method with the
establishment of a high level group of experts to facilitate national
convergence, policy learning and to advise the Commission. There is no
benchmarking as yet but there is now an institutional framework within
which to initiate it. Deakin – consistent with Clarke’s analysis - concludes
that the prospect of standardisation of company law has receded following
the experience of the Takeovers Directive and the fragmentation of
national laws that resulted from it. At the same time, there is scope for a
reflexive form of governance to allow for policy learning. At the same
time, what he sees as a fixation with one mode of best practice based on
the US model reduces scope for reflexive governance and diversity. In
labour law, there is greater scope for flexibility. In both fields, the role of
the European Court and its capacity to change the regulatory environment
through broadly liberalising judgments is highlighted. Like Scott, the
open method is viewed as a progression and not a completely new method
of governance. The challenge is not new or old governance but what level
of formality is necessary given the tension between state autonomy and
the goal of European integration with the deliberative models at the heart
of new governance while playing lip service to national diversity having
the capacity to tend toward the imposition of single models. Reflexive
harmonisation may in this situation provide a better model.
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Peer Zumbansen’s paper takes as his focus the firm and challenges the
questionable divide between management and labour that lies at the heart
of e.g. .the social partnership in EU law-making. As with Scott and
Deakin, the paper attempts to bridge a conventional space this time
between corporate and labour law literatures by building on the theory of
the innovative enterprise. Through that theory and its insights Zumbansen
argues that corporate governance regimes are embedded in differently
shaped regulatory frameworks, that in turn are characterised by distinct
institutions (formal and informal) and enforcement processes. His paper
also points to diversity and challenges the view that there is convergence
of corporate governance.
He discusses what is meant by corporate
governance before examining corporate governance in Germany and the
EU and the changing regulatory landscape in both locales. He also notes
that the Commission is now differentiating its law making agenda given
the political obstacles to convergence. Like Clarke, Deakin and Barrett,
he notes the importance of the European Court’s case law in prompting
reform with that case-law creating regulatory competition in the field of
corporate governance. Mindful of the growth of soft law initiatives, he
warns that any evaluation of European company law requires an analysis
of these regimes as well as legislation. He provides a forward looking
agenda to complete the series by drawing on the Varieties of Capitalism
literature and complimenting it with a regulatory theory approach and a
shift away from conventional bi-polar conceptions of the firm as either a
nexus-of-contracts or a social institution towards one that takes into
account the particular features of its decision-making processes which are
shaped by high-risk assessment of uncertain development trajectories.
Thus the papers end with an agenda for further research in the field of
corporate governance with all of them highlighting the absence of a clear
dichotomy between hard and soft law with characteristics normally
associated with soft law - inextricably bound up with new governance
methods – of uncertainty, ambiguity and principles rather than fixed
norms also found within classic Community legislation such as the
Takeover Directive. Through discussion of implementation as well as the
wider theoretical dimensions, the papers also remind us of the challenge of
multi-level governance in the European context and the need for ongoing
evidence-based research in evaluating the effectiveness and legitimacy of
governance regimes.

